The EU-Ukraine agreement wasn’t the single issue in 2014, though it the catalyst. Economic integration with the EU was seen by both the West and Russia as a vital step in reforming Ukraine so that it could become part of the Western alliance - this was said explicitly over and over in Western capitals and NATO papers. Inside Ukraine it wasn’t seen that way, as most Ukrainians wanted to enjoy good relations with both sides but to elevate themselves to Western standards - until 2014. For Russia however, it meant the end of economic influence which was its chief way of exerting political influence to keep Ukraine neutral or friendly, and for an important subset of Ukrainian security and political actors who would win out during 2014, it was in fact a path to NATO.
You’re forgetting that Euromaidan was first and foremost a nationalist and anti-Russian movement, and that the ethnic issue is really what led to the civil war and Russian hostility to Kiev. People for some reason tend to overlook this when talking about EU, NATO etc. The real litmus test for Russia as to whether Ukraine would become a “hostile” (ime pro-West) state was Kiev’s relationship with ethnically Russian regions of Ukraine.
The EU-Ukraine agreement wasn’t the single issue in 2014, though it the catalyst. Economic integration with the EU was seen by both the West and Russia as a vital step in reforming Ukraine so that it could become part of the Western alliance - this was said explicitly over and over in Western capitals and NATO papers. Inside Ukraine it wasn’t seen that way, as most Ukrainians wanted to enjoy good relations with both sides but to elevate themselves to Western standards - until 2014.
Exactly. Ukraine didn’t want to join NATO. It doesn’t matter what NATO or westerns think or Russia thinks, it was up to Ukraine. They had no intentions of joining NATO, until Russia annexed Crimea.
For Russia however, it meant the end of economic influence which was its chief way of exerting political influence to keep Ukraine neutral or friendly, and for an important subset of Ukrainian security and political actors who would win out during 2014, it was in fact a path to NATO.
Except Russia annexed Crimea before the election. If Russia was worried about a pro-NATO government why would they do something that guarantees a pro-NATO government? I think it’s pretty obvious neutral Ukraine was not the goal for Russia.
If you make a claim this outrageous, you need to back it up. Ukraine officially entered into negotiations to join NATO and entered a membership action program to do so. It does in fact matter what the two forces with most impact on Ukraine’s economy, politics and security environment believe and aim for.
Except Russia annexed Crimea before the election. If Russia was worried about a pro-NATO government why would they do something that guarantees a pro-NATO government?
Let’s say that it was up to Ukraine whether or not to join NATO (which it was.) Russia had absolutely no guarantee that Ukrainian leadership would remain anti-NATO. Time wasn’t on Russia’s side - the lure of the EU and greater association with the West would be a death knell for the style of politics Russia relied upon to forestall pro-NATO reforms in Ukraine. Euromaidan changed the rules of the game. It was a Ukrainian sovereignty movement, with explicitly anti-Putin and some ultranationalist anti-Russian characteristics. The second Yanukovych fled, the game was over for Russia, and the second that he left, Western diplomats became heavily involved in helping craft a new government for Ukraine.
The EU-Ukraine agreement wasn’t the single issue in 2014, though it the catalyst. Economic integration with the EU was seen by both the West and Russia as a vital step in reforming Ukraine so that it could become part of the Western alliance - this was said explicitly over and over in Western capitals and NATO papers. Inside Ukraine it wasn’t seen that way, as most Ukrainians wanted to enjoy good relations with both sides but to elevate themselves to Western standards - until 2014. For Russia however, it meant the end of economic influence which was its chief way of exerting political influence to keep Ukraine neutral or friendly, and for an important subset of Ukrainian security and political actors who would win out during 2014, it was in fact a path to NATO.
You’re forgetting that Euromaidan was first and foremost a nationalist and anti-Russian movement, and that the ethnic issue is really what led to the civil war and Russian hostility to Kiev. People for some reason tend to overlook this when talking about EU, NATO etc. The real litmus test for Russia as to whether Ukraine would become a “hostile” (ime pro-West) state was Kiev’s relationship with ethnically Russian regions of Ukraine.
Exactly. Ukraine didn’t want to join NATO. It doesn’t matter what NATO or westerns think or Russia thinks, it was up to Ukraine. They had no intentions of joining NATO, until Russia annexed Crimea.
Except Russia annexed Crimea before the election. If Russia was worried about a pro-NATO government why would they do something that guarantees a pro-NATO government? I think it’s pretty obvious neutral Ukraine was not the goal for Russia.
If you make a claim this outrageous, you need to back it up. Ukraine officially entered into negotiations to join NATO and entered a membership action program to do so. It does in fact matter what the two forces with most impact on Ukraine’s economy, politics and security environment believe and aim for.
Let’s say that it was up to Ukraine whether or not to join NATO (which it was.) Russia had absolutely no guarantee that Ukrainian leadership would remain anti-NATO. Time wasn’t on Russia’s side - the lure of the EU and greater association with the West would be a death knell for the style of politics Russia relied upon to forestall pro-NATO reforms in Ukraine. Euromaidan changed the rules of the game. It was a Ukrainian sovereignty movement, with explicitly anti-Putin and some ultranationalist anti-Russian characteristics. The second Yanukovych fled, the game was over for Russia, and the second that he left, Western diplomats became heavily involved in helping craft a new government for Ukraine.