Quoting Penelope Kissoudi’s The Balkan Games and Balkan Politics in the Interwar Years 1929–1939: Politicians in Pursuit of Peace, page 40:

The first initiatives in the improvement of Greek–Italian relations were taken by the dictator Pangalos in the years 1925 and 1926. [160] After the collapse of this régime, [Rome] hastened to propose a treaty of arbitration between Greece and Italy. The 1926 Greek–Italian trade agreement paved the way for closer financial collaboration and provided the possibility of future political agreement. [161]

While an autocrat intentionally improving his government’s relation with Fascist Italy may be unsurprising, what is notable is the continuity between the autocracy and the pseudodemocracy that followed. Indeed, Athenian relations with Fascist Italy only continued to improve after Greece’s autocracy collapsed.

In July 1927, the Greek Foreign Minister Andreas Michalakopoulos and George Kafandaris, Minister of Finance (from 1926 to 1928), paid a visit to Rome. They both aspired to closer financial cooperation with Italy as well as [Fascist] support of the Greek demand for a bank loan from the League of Nations. [162]

Greek–Italian relations entered a new phase when, by the end of 1927, Michalakopoulos, returning to Athens from Geneva, took the opportunity to meet Mussolini. [163] Discussions between the Greek Foreign Minister and the Italian Premier paved the way for the Greco‐Italian treaty of September 1928 agreed by Venizelos and Mussolini. [164]

Venizelos, for those of us unaware, was a Liberal politician whom the Entente supported against Greece’s monarchy, which was neutral in World War I. Since most Greeks had no interest in getting involved in another war, Venizelos’s régime had to exercise a reign of terror to discipline the general population. It may be hard to believe that the commoners preferred monarchism over Liberalism, but it makes sense given how the Entente imposed a Liberal régime on Greece, which, unlike the monarchy, was pro‐war. This is why the author’s assertion that ‘much of the country was behind him’ (again?) should be treated with caution.

That aside, it should be striking that a Liberal Minister of Finance deliberately sought closer financial cooperation with a Fascist state.

The preservation of friendship with Britain and France, the re‐establishment of relationships with Italy and the Balkan neighbours and agreement with Turkey took precedence over all other issues. […] Venizelos […] focused on respect for the territorial status quo. He was opposed to revisionism and [now] dedicated to peace except in case of unprovoked attack. He aspired to avoid foreign entanglements that would either align Greece with some of the great powers or might compel it to rely upon a great power. More significantly, the establishment of friendly relations with Balkan neighbours was priority. [168]

Page 41:

One of the most difficult tasks Venizelos had to accomplish was to persuade London, Paris and Belgrade that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rome signified no alienation by Athens of its traditional friends. He made clear from the beginning that he would utilize the potential agreement with [Fascist] Italy to compel Yugoslavia to waive excessive claims on Greece and to accept his own conditions for a treaty between the two sides. [169]

Although the prerequisites for successful negotiations between Rome and Athens had been well prepared by Foreign Minister Andreas Michalakopoulos in late 1927, Venizelos’s initial effort towards the restoration of good fellowship between [Fascist] Italy and Greece did not initially meet with a positive response. [170] Nonetheless, Greek–Italian relations would be soon restored due to the strong determination of the Greek premier.

The appointment of Alexander Karapanos, former ambassador in Rome, a man who was highly esteemed by the [Fascist] government, as Foreign Minister was the first sure step in achieving Greek–Italian rapprochement. [171] For this reason, it was a suitable time for the Greek premier to meet Mario Arlotta, the [Fascist] Ambassador in Athens, and discuss with him his intention to visit Rome for the purpose of concluding a Greek–Italian agreement. His visit to Rome was to be followed by a visit to Paris. [172]

Venizelos aspired to remove obstacles and dissipate Mussolini’s doubts. He was successful. During Venizelos’s visit to [Fascist] Italy, Mussolini expressed unqualified satisfaction with the initiative taken by his Greek opposite number and the unambiguous attitude of Greece towards [Fascist] Italy. [173] The two sides thus entered into fresh negotiations and the draft of the treaty submitted to the [Fascist] government was fully accepted. [174]

The Greco‐Italian treaty of amity, reconciliation and juridical settlement was eventually agreed in Rome on 23 September 1928. [175] The discussions between Venizelos and Mussolini were aimed at a political rapprochement that could ensure the vital interests of both sides. In consequence, the talks focused particularly on unreserved [Fascist] support for Greece at diplomatic level and on relations between Greece, France and Britain. [176]

The desire for the preservation of good relations between Greece and the great powers and unconditional cooperation with their satellites in the Balkan peninsula stimulated the Greek premier to reject on principle any tempting proposal for a treaty of alliance with Italy. Thus [Rome] did not get all it wanted, but [Athens] got much of what it wanted. Venizelos’s subsequent visit to Paris was designed to reassure the French government that there was no thought of rescinding the agreement with France, which had settled matters touching on Greek war debts. [177]

Page 42:

On 30 September 1928, Venizelos left Paris and travelled to London. Baron Oliver Harvey, British diplomat, in his report on Greek–British relationships, made at the request of Lord Cushendun, who was Foreign Secretary in Chamberlain’s absence, emphasized two crucial points. The first concerned the positive position of the British government on the Greek–Italian treaty, while the second touched on London’s concern for the interests of British companies in Greece. [179]

Venizelos met no serious difficulty in persuading the British rulers of his good intentions. The British government realized that the rapprochement between Greece and Italy, under the terms of the League of Nations, was no threat to British interests in the eastern Mediterranean. [180] Sir Percy Loraine stated, in late 1928, that he had no doubt about Venizelos’s reliability and his good intentions.

(Emphasis added in all cases.)